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Cognitive dissonance phenomena were examined from a perspective of goal systems 
theory (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002).  The 
goal-systemic analysis challenges revisions to Festinger’s (1957) original formulation 
that narrow the scope of dissonance theory by asserting the necessity of cognitive 
contents specifically related to the self-concept (Aronson, 1992; Cooper & Fazio, 
1984; Steele, 1988) for dissonance arousal.  The goal-systemic analysis, however, 
attempts to go beyond the original formulation (Festinger, 1957) in identifying the 
critical inconsistency in dissonance arousal as occurring between a goal 
representation and any information that conveys frustration of the goal.  Hence, goal 
activation patterns are assumed to play a critical role in dissonance phenomena.  To 
the extent that one is actively committed to a goal, hindrances arouse dissonance 
while inhibition of that goal decreases the degree of dissonance arousal.  Two 
experiments were conducted to put these notions to an empirical test.  Experiment 1
examined the role of goal activation patterns in cognitive dissonance phenomena 
through the employment of a priming procedure.  In a study conducted within the 
induced compliance paradigm participants generated counterattitudinal arguments.  
This experiment demonstrated that priming participants with the goal of honesty 
increased dissonance induced attitude change, while dissonance effects were 
attenuated by priming a competing goal (i.e. compliance).  Direct evidence was not 
found, however, that this effect was mediated by the degree of active commitment to 
the honesty goal.  Experiment 2 tested the assumption that the implication of the self-
concept and free choice are necessary for dissonance phenomena to occur.  In the free 
choice paradigm dissonance effects were obtained, as evidenced by the spreading of 
alternatives effect, in the absence of choice when participants were primed with a 
goal not related to the self-concept. This effect, however, was primarily driven by the 
upgrading of the received alternative without evidence of the downgrading of the not 
received alternative.  Further implications for cognitive dissonance theory are briefly 
discussed.
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1Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine cognitive dissonance 
phenomena from a perspective of goal systems theory (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, 
Chun, Sleeth-Keppler, 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002; 2003; Shah, Kruglanski & 
Friedman, 2002; Fishbach, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2003). This approach is closer in 
spirit to Festinger’s (1957) original formulation that a person holding any two 
psychologically inconsistent cognitions would experience dissonance than to its 
subsequent major revisions, (those by Aronson,1992; Cooper & Fazio ,1984; or 
Steele, 1988)  which emphasize the contents of specific cognitions having to do with 
the self-concept, or self-esteem.  Like Festinger’s (1957) formulation, the present one 
too is content free in that it does not emphasize contents of specific cognitions.  
Beyond this commonality with the original formulation, the present analysis goes 
beyond Festinger’s (1957) original formulation in two major ways. (1) It identifies 
the critical cognitive inconsistency as one occurring between a goal representation
and a behavior or event inconsistent with the goal. (2) It draws on the cognitive 
approach to motivation embodied in goal systems theory (e.g. Kruglanski et al., 2002) 
to elaborate the process whereby dissonance-driven attitude change may take place. 
Such process will be investigated via fine-grained priming techniques designed to tap 
goal-activation patterns assumed to mediate cognitive change in situations where 
dissonance reduction may be expected to occur. 
The present dissertation is structured as follows. First, a brief discussion of 
dissonance theory is given highlighting two major dissonance paradigms (namely, the 
“induced compliance” and the “free choice” paradigms) to be empirically investigated 
2from the present conceptual perspective. Subsequently, the three major revisions of 
dissonance theory (namely Aronson’s (1992), Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) and Steele’s 
(1988)) are briefly reviewed emphasizing their content-related elements at variance 
with the present proposal. Finally, two experimental studies are conducted to put the 
present goal-systemic analysis to an empirical test. 
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
The theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) has been often regarded 
as the most important and influential theory in the history of social psychology (cf. 
Jones, 1985). According to Festinger (1957) cognitions that are relevant to each other 
can be either consonant or dissonant.  According to Festinger, “two elements are in 
dissonant relationship if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element 
would follow from the other.  To state it a bit more formally, x and y are dissonant if 
not-x follows from y” (Festinger, 1957, p.13).  The presence of dissonance is 
assumed to cause psychological discomfort that the individual is motivated to reduce.
The magnitude of dissonance is thought to depend on the dissonance ratio, 
that is, on the proportion of dissonant cognitions among all of one’s active cognitions, 
weighted by these cognitions importance. In other words, the magnitude of 
dissonance equals the number of dissonant cognitions divided by the number of 
consonant plus dissonant cognitions, weighted by the importance of the cognitions 
involved. From this it follows that dissonance can be reduced by: (1) the removal of 
dissonant cognitions, (2) the addition of consonant cognitions, (3) by reducing the 
perceived importance of dissonant cognitions, or (4) by increasing the perceived 
importance of consonant cognitions. 
3A common example used in illustrating the concept of dissonance involves the 
cigarette smoker.  For a smoker, the knowledge that smoking is bad for one’s health 
is dissonant with the cognition that he or she engages in this activity nevertheless. 
How can such dissonance be reduced? There appear to be several options of doing so. 
For instance, our smoker could simply alter his or her behavior, and quit smoking. 
This behavior would remove the dissonant cognition that one is doing something 
which is bad for one’s health. As most smokers would attest, however, this particular 
option may be notoriously difficult to carry out. Perhaps an easier way of reducing 
dissonance might be by taking the cognitive rather than the behavioral route, e.g. by 
changing the belief that smoking is bad for one’s health.  This too would remove the 
dissonant cognition that what one does is bad for one’s health. Alternatively, the 
smoker could remind her or himself of the benefits of smoking, such as sporting a 
care-free, devil-may-care attitude, or enjoying the benefits of relaxation and tension-
reduction that smoking may foster. The latter tactic amounts to the addition of 
cognitions consonant with the act of smoking. As yet another possibility, the smoker 
may reduce dissonance by reminding him or herself that the dangers of smoking are 
truly mild as compared to the dangers of unprotected sex, or the use of narcotics. This 
represents dissonance-reduction via lowering the importance of the dissonant 
cognitions.  Finally, our smoker could conclude that the benefits of smoking 
(acquiring a devil-may-care image, relaxation) are very important.  This would reduce 
dissonance by increasing the importance of consonant cognitions.
Note that in the discussion thus far, there is no mention of the contents of 
cognitions that may constitute the dissonant or the consonant elements considered by 
4the individual. Inevitably, however, in translating the theoretical notions operationally 
in various dissonance experiments - - specific contents had to be defined. As shown 
subsequently, such contents were then re-infused into the theory and assumed to be of 
a critical theoretical importance in the various revisions of dissonance theory. These 
developments narrowed the scope of Festinger’s (1957) original formulation and tied 
it to specific cognitive contents (i.e. those related to the self-concept). We now turn to 
describe two major experimental paradigms wherein such contents played a major 
role, namely the “induced compliance” and the “free choice” paradigms.
The “induced compliance” paradigm. 
One of the earliest and most influential of cognitive dissonance studies was 
conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) in what Festinger termed the forced
compliance paradigm, but is now more commonly referred to as the induced 
compliance paradigm. This study tested the counterintuitive prediction that the 
smaller the reward one receives for engaging in a counterattitudinal behavior, the 
greater the change in attitude towards consistency with the behavior.  Participants in 
this study performed a boring task and were induced for either a small ($1.00) or a 
large ($20.00) reward to tell another student (actually, an experimenter’s confederate) 
that the boring task they had just completed actually was “fun, exciting and 
enjoyable”. The main dependent variable in this study was the degree to which 
participants rated the task as enjoyable under these circumstances. According to 
dissonance theory, participants in the $1.00 condition should do so more than their 
counterparts in the $20.00 condition. That is because in the $1.00 condition 
participants should experience dissonance engendered by the knowledge that one’s 
5behavior, stating that the task was interesting, is inconsistent with their attitude 
towards the task.   Further, that participants will receive $1 is not sufficient to justify 
the action.  The magnitude of dissonance should be considerably less in the $20.00 
condition owing to the consonant cognition that one received a substantial monetary 
reward, or sufficient external justification, for making the untruthful statement.  The 
findings of Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) confirmed the dissonance theory 
prediction that participants in the $1.00 condition rated the (boring) task they had 
performed significantly more enjoyable than did the $20.00 participants. Note that 
while originally the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study was intended as an 
illustration of Festinger’s (1957) original content-free notions concerning dissonance-
- subsequent interpreters (Aronson, 1992; Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Steele, 1988) 
extracted from it certain elements not present in the original formulation that they 
now viewed as critical to the arousal of dissonance, notably cognitions representing a 
threat to one’s self-concept (Aronson, 1968; Steele, 1988), related to personal 
responsibility for aversive consequences (Cooper and Fazio, 1984).
The “free-choice” paradigm.
The free choice paradigm has been employed in cognitive dissonance research 
to examine the implications of cognitive dissonance theory for situations involving 
choice.  According to Festinger, when one makes a choice the positive aspects of the 
chosen alternative (and the negative aspects of the unchosen alternative) are 
consonant with the choice behavior.  Conversely, the positive aspects of the unchosen 
alternative (and the negative aspects of the chosen alternative) are dissonant with the 
choice behavior.  Therefore, choosing between two alternatives may produce 
6dissonance and a consequent motivation to reduce dissonance.  In choice situations 
dissonance may be reduced by making the chosen alternative more desirable and the 
unchosen alternative less desirable.  This is referred to as the spreading of 
alternatives, as two alternatives that may have been close in desirability before a 
decision had been made become further apart in desirability after a decision has been 
made. 
In a study by Brehm (1956) participants, female students at the University of 
Minnesota, were presented with eight products and told that one of the products 
would be awarded to each participant as a token of appreciation for her participation 
in the study.  Participants first rated the attractiveness of each of the eight products.  
In a critical experimental condition, they were then given a choice between two 
products that were close in desirability.  After making the choice participants were 
asked to read research reports concerning four of the products.  After reading the 
reports, participants were asked to re-rate the desirability of the products.  The 
findings indicated that participants changed their evaluations of the products and 
became more positive about the chosen alternative and less positive about the rejected 
product (the spreading of alternatives effect). According to Brehm (1956) this reflects 
the process of reducing the post decisional dissonance aroused by the negative aspects 
of the chosen alternative and the positive aspects of the rejected alternative.
   A further interpretation of these findings offered by Steele, Spencer, and Lynch 
(1993) argued that dissonance is aroused because the negative consequences of the 
choice are a threat to one’s self-concept as a competent decision maker.  To resolve 
the dissonance in this situation, there occurs the post decisional spreading of 
7alternatives.  The chosen alternative becomes more attractive, while the unchosen 
alternative becomes less attractive, in the interest of protecting one’s self image as a 
judicious decider.  Again the subsequent interpretations of early dissonance 
experiments (the classic study by Brehm, 1956 in this instance), isolated certain 
elements of the experimental situation (like choice, or self-image) and defined them 
as critical to the arousal of dissonance (Aronson, 1968; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Steele, 
1988) even though these didn’t figure in Festinger’s (1957) original, content-free, 
formulation.
Revisions of Dissonance Theory
As Festinger stated, “If a theory is at all testable, it will not remain unchanged. 
It has to change (Appendix B, Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999, p. 383).”  Festinger’s 
theory of cognitive dissonance has certainly been one of the most tested theories in 
the history of psychology and, indeed, it has undergone numerous changes over the 
past 35 years.  As emphasized earlier, such changes involved the refocusing of the 
theory on certain content-elements of demonstrable importance in specific dissonance 
experiments (Kruglanski & Klar, 1987; Kruglanski, 1989) and made them into 
generally important elements critical to the state of dissonance as such. In the 
following section, I examine three such major revisions of dissonance theory referred 
to earlier, namely Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) Aversive Consequences revision, 
Aronson’s (1992) self consistency formulation, and Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation 
formulation.  
8Aversive consequences
Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) aversive consequences revision states that the 
attitude change found in dissonance experiments stems from people’s desire to avoid 
feeling personally responsible for the production of aversive consequences. In other 
words, this formulation states that such a feeling is necessary and sufficient for the 
production of dissonance.  An intriguing contention of Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) 
assertion is that, contrary to Festinger’s (1957) original formulation cognitive 
inconsistency is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce dissonance and 
dissonance reduction. By contrast, feeling personally responsible for foreseeable, 
aversive consequences was deemed both necessary and sufficient. According to this 
formulation, participants in the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) experiment, for 
example, changed their attitudes precisely in order to avoid feeling personally 
responsible for producing the aversive consequence of having others participate in a 
boring study due to the misleading statements they made to these individuals.  
An experiment by Cooper and Worchel (1970) is often cited as important 
evidence for the aversive consequences formulation. This experiment constituted an 
extended replication of the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study, with the additional 
variable of consequences accruing to the counterattitudinal behavior.  In the aversive 
consequences condition, the confederate appeared to be convinced that the study was 
interesting. In the no-aversive consequences condition, by contrast, the confederate 
appeared not to be convinced.  Consistent with Cooper and Worchel’s (1970) 
predictions, only participants who believed that they had been effectively deceitful 
showed dissonance induced attitude change. In the Cooper and Fazio (1984) view 
9then, the judgment that one was responsible for aversive consequences represents the 
cognitive contents critical to dissonance phenomena in general. 
Self-consistency
Another revision of cognitive dissonance theory was Aronson’s (1992) self-
consistency formulation whereby dissonance is assumed to be aroused when an 
inconsistency exists between one’s behavior and one’s self-concept.  Aronson 
assumed that people generally have positive self-concepts that portray them as 
competent, moral, and able.  When engaging in behaviors inconsistent with such a 
positive self-concept, such as deceiving someone into thinking that a boring task is 
interesting, or advocating a counter-attitudinal position- - we experience dissonance.  
In other words, when engaging in an activity that makes us feel foolish, immoral, or 
incompetent, we experience dissonance which we attempt to reduce through some 
process of self-justification.  
The self-consistency revision agrees with the original formulation of 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) as far as the effects of inconsistency are 
concerned.  However, where the original formulation asserted that inconsistency 
between any two cognitive elements could be dissonance arousing, the self-
consistency revision asserts that there needs to exist a specific type of cognitive 
inconsistency, namely inconsistency with the self-concept for dissonance to be 
experienced. According to this view, the self-concept acts as a standard, and 
performance of activities inconsistent with that standard is dissonance arousing.  
10
In contrast to Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) framework, Aronson’s self-
consistency revision argues that the production of aversive consequences to others is 
not necessary for dissonance arousal.  It argues, instead, that acts inconsistent with the 
self-concept are dissonance arousing even if the dissonant act had positive 
consequences. Evidence for this contention was furnished by an experiment of 
Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991).  Their study induced male college students to make 
arguments advocating the use of condoms.  In one condition, participants were told 
that their arguments would be video-recorded for use with high school students. In 
another condition, participants rehearsed the arguments without being videotaped.  
The experiment also involved a hypocrisy manipulation.  Half the participants were 
reminded of instances when they themselves had failed to use condoms, while the 
other half were not so reminded.  The main phenomenon of interest was the degree to 
which participants reported their intention to use condoms in the future. The finding 
was that the only participants who reduced dissonance by reporting a greater intention 
to use condoms in the future were the students who both made the video and had been 
reminded of their past failures to abide by their own advice.  Aronson’s (1999) 
argument was that there should not have been the production of aversive 
consequences because the students had actually done something that benefited the 
high school students, but they had been made to feel like hypocrites.  Therefore, 
dissonance reduction was necessary because the hypocritical act was inconsistent 
with participants’ self-conception as moral individuals, but not because of their 
feeling responsible for the production of aversive consequences to others.
11
It is worth noting that Cooper (1999) has since broadened his definition of 
aversive consequences to include any outcome that the actor, rather than the target of 
the act, perceived as aversive.  Accordingly, aversive consequences are not limited to 
situations wherein one generates aversive consequences for others.  On this 
definition, hypocrisy, for example, would qualify as an aversive consequence, if it 
countered the actor’s value of sincerity, thus explaining the results of Aronson et al. 
(1991) in Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) terms.  At any rate, the “personal responsibility” 
part seems common to both the Aronson (1992) and the Cooper and Fazio (1984) 
formulations as does the implied damage to one’s self-concept accruing from the 
specific cognitive contents whereby one is responsible for a negative outcome of 
whatever kind. 
Self- affirmation
According to Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation theory, dissonance effects are 
not the result of cognitive inconsistency, inconsistency between behavior and the self-
concept, or the perceived personal responsibility for producing foreseeable, aversive 
consequences.  Rather, self-affirmation theory posits that people possess a self-
affirmation drive such that our thoughts and actions are guided by a strong motivation 
to maintain our moral and adaptive integrity (Steele, 1988). As we are not motivated 
by cognitive consistency per se our motivation to restore a global sense of self-worth 
can be satisfied in ways that are rather unrelated to the dissonant act (Steele & Lui, 
1983).  According to this view, global self-worth can be restored by any behavior that 
affirms it.  
12
Steele’s (1988) view of dissonance arousal and reduction further differs from 
Aronson’s (1992) self-consistency revision in that the self is posited to constitute a 
resource as opposed to a standard. Consequently, these two perspectives differ in 
their perspective on the role of self-esteem in dissonance phenomena. According to 
the self-consistency revision, individuals with high (vs. low) self-esteem should be 
more likely to experience dissonance (or experience a higher magnitude of 
dissonance) because they have a higher standard with which to compare their actions. 
According to the self-affirmation perspective, by contrast, individuals with a high 
self-esteem should be less likely to experience dissonance (or experience a lesser 
magnitude of dissonance) because if they commit a dissonant act, they have more of a 
resource which can be recruited in maintaining or restoring their global sense of self-
worth.  Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) found evidence for this proposition in an 
experiment employing the free-choice paradigm.  In this experiment, participants with 
high self-esteem rationalized their decisions less than participants with low self-
esteem. Though Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation formulation differs in important 
ways from both Aronson’s (1992) and Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) revised versions of 
dissonance theory, from the present perspective these three revisions share an 
important commonality having to do with the self-concept as a pivotal  variable in 
dissonance phenomena. As noted earlier, this emphasis differs from Festinger’s 
(1957) original version of dissonance theory that didn’t accord the self-concept a 
comparable importance; nor does the present approach inspired by goal systems 
theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002). In what follows, the latter framework is briefly 
13
described to subsequently consider what novel insights it may afford into 
understanding dissonance phenomena.
A Goal-Systemic Perspective
Overview of goal-systems theory.
Goal systems theory adopts a cognitive approach to motivation (Kruglanski, 
1996 a,b).  It proposes that our goal structures have a cognitive aspect and thus they 
share many similarities with other cognitive structures. Specifically, goal systems are 
posited to be similar to cognitive structures in the ways in which they are acquired, 
activated, and changed and to be distinguished from other cognitive structures only in 
their contents.  Specifically, goal systems have motivational contents with specific 
implications for thought, affect and action that differ from non-motivational cognitive 
contents. For instance the concept of a goal implies a striving for its attainment, and 
the experience of frustration upon its non-attainment. By contrast, non motivational 
constructs such as sky, table, or apple do not have similar implications.
Interconnectedness.
The term goal system refers to cognitive structures consisting of 
interconnected elements. These elements are mental representations of various goals, 
of their attainment means, as well as hindrances or barriers on the way to goal 
attainment.  In other words goals represent desirable end states to which one has some 
degree of commitment, and these goals are attached to means, or actions instrumental 
to their attainment.  The interconnections within a goal system can be facilitative or 
14
inhibitory. A facilitative connection between elements implies that one element will 
be cognitively activated by another.  Typically, means have a facilitative connection 
to goals they are meant to serve. Indeed, prior research (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003) 
has demonstrated that the presentation of means cognitively activates, or primes, their 
associated goals. Furthermore, hindrances, too, are facilitatively associated with the 
goals which attainment they undermine. Along these lines, Fishbach, Friedman, and 
Kruglanski (2003) demonstrated that “temptations”, e.g. tasty but fattening foods—
activate the overarching goal of dieting with respect to which they constitute a 
hindrance. 
Inhibitory connections characterize relations between competing goals, for 
instance.  To borrow an example from the stereotyping literature, self enhancement 
goals may increase stereotyping as one derogates an outgroup member to establish the 
superiority of the ingroup, thereby enhancing the self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  If one has the goal of being non-prejudiced, then these goals would be in 
competition and have an inhibitory connection.   The occurrence and degree to which 
one goal would inhibit another is a function of the relative subjective utility (SU) of 
the two goals each weighted by its degree of activation (A) at a given moment. 
Subjective Utility is defined as a multiplicative function of the valence attached to a 
given goal times its expectancy of attainment. Activation refers to the accessibility of 
a goal construct in memory at a given time (cf. Higgins, 1996). The product A x  SU, 
referred to as active commitment determines the proportion of (attentional and 
energetic) resources the individual would invest in a given goal. It is assumed 
(Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002) that the total 
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amount of such resources at any given moment is limited. Thus, the greater the 
product A1 x SU1 for Goal G1 relative to the product A2 x SU2 for Goal G2 the greater 
the investment of resources in the first versus the second goal. The withdrawal of 
resources will manifest itself in (1) inhibition of the goal representation, indexed e.g. 
by slower response times on a lexical decision task as well as (2) lesser perceived 
importance of the goal. In this vein, Shah and Kruglanski (2002) have shown that the 
activation of a new goal with a relatively high degree of commitment exerts a “goal 
pull” effect on a previously active focal goal, manifested by reduced activation of the 
latter goal and its lessened perceived importance. 
Along with other motivational theories  (for a review see Kruglanski, 1996) 
goal systems theory assumes also that goal-attainment gives rise to a positive affect 
and that thwarting of a goal pursuit, that is encountering a barrier or a hindrance gives 
rise to a negative affect experienced as aversive arousal (Festinger, 1957). The 
magnitude of such affect will depend on the individual’s active commitment to the 
goal. I further assume that the negative affect will set in motion active attempts to 
reduce it by removing the sense of hindrance, or thwarting. 
Goal-systemic analysis of dissonance phenomena.
An important question often raised with regard to the theory of cognitive 
dissonance concerns the precise nature of the inconsistency that this theory assumes 
(Kruglanski & Klar, 1987). According to the present analysis, such inconsistency 
refers to a discrepancy between a desired state, that is a goal representation, and some 
current state. Any information that conveys a thwarting or frustration of the goal is 
“dissonant” by the present analysis, and is assumed to engender a state of negative 
16
affective arousal and to prompt activities (on cognitive or behavioral levels) designed 
to lower it by altering in some way the cognition that one’s goal is indeed frustrated.
From the present perspective, dissonance reduction processes (Festinger, 1957) are, 
specifically, such attempts at removing the sense of goal frustration.
The foregoing, goal-systemic, analysis of dissonance phenomena has several 
implications. One implication concerns the critical role played in dissonance 
phenomena of goal activation patterns. Thus, I assume that the degree to which a goal 
frustrated by a given behavior or event is cognitively activated at a given moment will 
determine the degree to which individuals will experience aversive affect, and the 
extent to which they will attempt to reduce it. Consistent with the theoretic notions 
described above such goal activation should depend on the degree to which the 
relevant goal representation is primed by external events, and also on the individuals’ 
momentarily active commitment to competing goals.  
The second implication derives from the fact that the goal-systemic analysis 
of dissonance phenomena does not distinguish between different goal contents, and 
does not single out the self-concept as critical to dissonance arousal. An implication 
of this analysis is that dissonance type phenomena can occur without the perception 
of a free choice in exercising a given behavior, or of having a personal responsibility 
for a given outcome.  The three experimental studies that follow submit these notions 
to an empirical test.  A preliminary study was first conducted within the induced 
compliance paradigm, addressing the goal activation aspect of our analysis.   This 
study was followed up with second study, also conducted within the induced 
compliance paradigm, which attempted to address shortcomings of the preliminary 
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study.  The third study, conducted within the free choice paradigm, addressed the 
content free aspect of the present analysis related to the prediction that the frustration 
of some actively committed goals will give rise to dissonance type phenomena even 
in the absence of a free choice.
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Chapter 2: Preliminary Study Method
Goal-Systemic Effects in “Induced-Compliance” Paradigm
Consider the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) classic experiment in which 
participants induced to lie for an enticement of $1.00 (vs. $20.00) that a boring task 
which they just completed actually was fun and interesting reported subsequently a 
more positive attitude toward that task than did those who received $20.  In goal-
systemic terms, the act of lying is inconsistent with the goal of honesty; it constitutes 
a hindrance to this goal, hence it should activate it (Fishbach et al., 2002). This 
confrontation between the honesty goal and the act of lying, should occasion aversive 
affect and motivate an attempt to reduce it, via a positive attitude change toward the 
task. But why should the aversive affect be stronger in case of the $1.00 inducement 
than in case of the $20.00?  According to the goal-systemic analysis, the greater 
monetary value of the $20.00 (vs. the $1.00) inducement effects a greater active 
commitment to the monetary goal. This should “pull” away resources from the 
“honesty” goal reducing the active commitment to this goal, and the associated 
negative affect. Consequently, the lesser experienced frustration of the honesty goal 
should result in lesser attempts to remove it, and lesser attitude change toward the 
task. 
Note that this analysis of the induced compliance situation is very different 
from Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) dissonance-theoretic account. From the latter 
perspective, the $20.00 (vs. $1.00) incentive adds a cognition consonant with the act 
of lying “I have been paid a lot for making the false report” and that is the reason for 
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a reduced dissonance experienced in this condition. By contrast, the present goal-
systemic perspective suggests that the critical mediators of the relation between the 
magnitude of incentive and attitude change is the relative active commitment to the 
goals of monetary reward versus honesty. Specifically, in the $ 20.00 condition, 
participants’ active commitment to the reward goal, relative to the honesty goal may 
have been greater than in the $1.00 condition, and this difference may have mediated 
the differences in experienced negative affect and ultimately in task-attitudes reported 
by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959).  
The purpose of this study will be to explore these possibilities using the 
inducement to comply with the experimenter’s request in lieu of the monetary 
incentive manipulation used by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Research examining 
the manipulation of choice in dissonance studies has found that participants given 
high choice to advocate counterattitudinal positions are more likely to change their 
attitudes in the direction of the position advocated than participants given low choice.  
According to Festinger (Appendix B, Harmon-Jones & Mills, p. 383), “… in order for 
dissonance to be large enough to exist there has to be minimal pressure on the person 
to do what the person does.  If there is too much pressure, there is too much 
justification for having done it and it is all consonant with having done it, there is no 
dissonance.” Brehm and Cohen (p. 203, 1962), referring to participants’ feelings of 
volition stated it thusly, “the degree of volition will frequently be positively 
correlated with the magnitude of dissonance as defined in terms of dissonant and 
consonant cognitions….”  Referring specifically to the induced-compliance paradigm 
20
Brehm and Cohen (p. 204, 1962) assert that, “…the greater the force that produces 
compliance, the less is the ratio of dissonant to consonant cognitions…..”  
Again, classical dissonance accounts do not mention shifts in the degree to 
which various goals are activated.  According to those accounts, pressure adds a 
consonant cognition.  By contrast, the present goal-systemic perspective suggests that 
the critical mediators of the relation between presence of choice and attitude change 
is the relative active commitment to the goals of compliance versus honesty. 
Specifically, in the low choice condition, participants’ active commitment to the 
compliance goal, relative to the honesty goal may have been greater than in the low 
choice condition, and this difference may have mediated the differences in 
experienced negative affect and ultimately in task-attitudes reported by Festinger and
Carlsmith (1959).
Participants and Design
Participants in the study were 54 (33 female and 21 male) undergraduate 
students at the University of Maryland in College Park1.  Students took part in the 
experiment to earn extra credit for a course in Introductory Psychology.  
The design of the study was a 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: honesty 
goal vs. compliance goal vs. no prime) between subjects factorial.  Participants in a 
low or a high choice condition wrote counter attitudinal arguments in favor of 
comprehensive exams. After doing so, they were primed with the goal of honesty, the 
1
 There were originally 58 participants.  Three of these were deleted from the analysis because they did 
not check both boxes in the agreement form that manipulated low versus high choice. One more 
participant was excluded after reporting in the debriefing that she did know what “comprehensive 
exam” meant.
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goal of compliance, or a neutral (non goal-related) prime. The degree to which these 
priming manipulations varied the accessibility of the corresponding goals was 
assessed via a stem completion task. Subsequently, participants’ attitudes toward 
comprehensive exams were assessed in the context of an allegedly unrelated survey. I 
was interested in two sets of hypothesized findings: (1) the effects of the present 
independent variables on attitudes toward comprehensive exams; (2) the effects of the 
present independent variables on the relative accessibility of participants’ compliance 
and honesty goals. 
With regard to the first set of findings, it was predicted that (1) the neutral 
prime condition would replicate the typical finding in the induced compliance
paradigm manifested in more positive attitudes toward comprehensive exams under 
high versus low choice. Of greater interest, (2) relative to the neutral prime, the 
compliance prime should generally lower the favorability of attitudes toward 
comprehensive exams, particularly in the high choice condition, because under low 
choice conditions such attitudes should be already rather negative in the neutral 
condition as well. (3) Relative to the neutral prime, the honesty prime should 
generally increase the favorability of attitudes toward comprehensive exams, and 
particularly so under low choice because in the high choice condition such attitudes 
should be already rather positive in the neutral condition as well. Also of theoretical 
interest, (4) across the experimental design, the favorability of attitudes toward 
comprehensive exams should be mediated by the relative accessibility of the honesty 
versus the compliance goals.
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Regarding the second set of findings, I predicted that in the neutral prime
condition (1) the honesty goal would be more accessible (as measured by the stem 
completion task) under the choice versus no choice condition, (2) by contrast, the 
compliance goal would be more accessible under no choice versus the choice 
condition. Furthermore, (3) the compliance goal prime (as compared to the neutral 
prime) would increase the accessibility of the compliance goal particularly under high 
choice, because under low choice the compliance goal should be highly accessible 
already in the neutral condition. (4) Relative to the no prime condition, the 
compliance prime would lower the accessibility of the honesty goal, because of the 
pulling away of resources from the honesty goal that activation of the compliance 
goal may effect (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). Similarly, (5) the honesty goal prime (as 
compared to the neutral prime)  will increase the accessibility of the honesty goal, 
particularly under low choice, because under high choice the honesty goal should be 
highly accessible and already in the neutral condition. (6) Relative to the no-prime 
condition, the honesty prime would lower the accessibility of the compliance goal, 
again due to the pulling away of resources from the compliance goal that activation of 
the honesty goal may effect (Shah & Kruglanski’s (2002) “goal-pull” effect).  
Procedure
Participants first took part in a typical induced compliance study where they 
were asked to list under high choice or low choice conditions (counter attitudinal) 
arguments in favor of the implementation of comprehensive exams. Their arguments, 
participants were informed, were part of the efforts by the Council of Student-Faculty 
Affairs to understand students’ attitudes on this issue and might be used in an 
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information campaign planned by the administration in order to explain the need for 
implementing the exams. For the remainder of the time, participants were asked to 
take part in a memory experiment conducted by a team of cognitive psychologists. 
This task lasted for three minutes during which participants memorized a set of 
words. As detailed later, this part of the procedure incorporated our goal priming 
manipulation. Following that phase of the study, participants performed a filler task 
(drawing a map of campus) and completed a stem completion task designed to assess 
the accessibility of the compliance and honesty goals primed during the memorization 
part of the procedure. Next, participants were asked to complete a survey ostensibly 
from the Office of Institutional Research and Planning.  This questionnaire contained 
items intended to measure participants’ true attitude towards a tuition increase.  
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Choice Manipulation
Participants were told that they would be participating in a survey being 
conducted by the Council of Student-Faculty Affairs.  The survey was administered 
by a second experimenter presumably not connected with the memory study.   This 
experimenter informed participants that the Board of Regents at the University of 
Maryland was considering the implementation of comprehensive exams as a 
graduation requirement but asked the Council for Student-Faculty Affairs to examine 
what reasons there are for and against comprehensive exams, in order to develop an 
effective information campaign in case comprehensive exams were decided upon.  
Participants were advised that their responses would be conveyed to the Council and 
to the Board of Regents.  Participants were further informed that the Council desired 
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to understand the arguments relevant for both sides of the issue; therefore, the 
Council wanted students to list only one side, either supporting implementation or 
opposing implementation.  They were told that the Council had already collected a 
sufficient number of arguments opposing implementation; thus, the Council was 
seeking arguments favoring implementation. Participants, therefore, were requested 
to list arguments in favor of comprehensive exams.2
Before listing the arguments, participants were required to read and sign an 
agreement contract.  In the agreement contract, the explanation for the study was re-
stated.  In the high choice condition this explanation included the statement, “I 
recognize that I will be given experimental credit regardless of whether or not I 
generated arguments.  I sign it freely and voluntarily.”  The contracts of low choice 
participants did not include such a statement.  Further, high choice participants were 
required to check boxes in which they affirmed that they agreed of their free will to 
write arguments and to have them released to the council and the University Board of 
Regents.  Participants in the low choice condition were only required to check a box 
affirming that they had read the explanation of the study.
Participants were then asked to take the next 8 minutes to generate the 
strongest, most forceful arguments supporting the implementation of comprehensive 
exams as a graduation requirement at the University of Maryland.  After 8 minutes 
had passed, the experimenter collected the arguments, thanked participants for their 
participation, and exited the lab.
2 Participants typically generated arguments related to learning (e.g. “Exams will ensure that you have 
learned the material.”); evaluation (e.g. “Exams will provide another means to evaluate students.”); 
and preparation (e.g. “Exams could be asset when applying for jobs or graduate programs.”).
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Priming Manipulation
The priming manipulation was modeled after a procedure used by Hertel and 
Fiedler (1994).  Thirty adjectives were scattered unsystematically over a page. 
Participants were told that they would be given 3 minutes to study these words so that 
they could reproduce as many of them as possible at a later time.  Participants were 
further informed that the words could be arranged in two meaningful categories that 
might be helpful in memorizing the list.  The total set was comprised of 10 items 
forming a spatial category such as high, circle, and concave; 10 filler adjectives such 
as wintry, tired, and bookish; and 10 adjectives intended to bring about the priming 
effect.  Participants primed with the honesty goal were given adjectives such as 
truthful, honest, upright, and sincere; and participants primed with the compliance 
goal were given adjectives such as helpful, cooperative, and supportive.  Participants 
in the control condition received 5 color adjectives, such as blue, indigo, and bronze.
Measurement of Outcome Variables
Accessibility Measure
After performing a filler task that involved drawing a map of campus, 
participants completed a cued recall task in which they were given word stems and 
asked to complete the stems with the first word that came to mind.  The stem-
completion task (see Appendix A) served as a measure of accessibility of the honesty 
and compliance goals, proposed as mediator of the effects of the priming and choice 
manipulations on participants’ attitudes toward the issue of comprehensive exams.  
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Attitude Measure
Finally, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated survey from the Office 
of Institutional Research and Planning. This survey inquired into general questions 
about the quality of their experience at the University of Maryland.  Embedded in the 
questionnaire were questions asking about their attitude toward comprehensive 
exams. The critical question in the survey asked participants to rate the extent to 
which they agreed with the statement, “The University should implement 
comprehensive exams for Seniors.”  Responses were obtained on a 7-point scaled that 
ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  Participants placed their 
responses in an envelope addressed to the Office of Institutional Research and 
Planning and were told that their responses would not be seen by experimenter.  This 
concluded the experiments. Participants were thoroughly debriefed according to a 
procedure suggested by Mills (1976) and their questions, if any were answered.
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Chapter 3: Preliminary Results
Outcome Measures
Attitude Measure
Participants’ attitude toward the implementation of comprehensive exams was 
investigated using a 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: compliance vs. neutral vs. 
honesty) factorial ANOVA.  The 2-way interaction was not significant F (2, 48) = 
.93, ns; however, there were trends in the data consistent with my predictions.  High 
choice/neutral prime participants (M = 2.78) had a more favorable attitude toward 
comprehensive exams than low choice/neutral prime participants (M = 1.33).  This 
pattern replicated the typical dissonance finding.  High choice/neutral prime 
participants (M = 2.78) also had a more favorable attitude toward comprehensive 
exams than high choice/compliance prime participants (M = 1.44).  This trend is 
consistent with the prediction that activation of the compliance goal should inhibit the 
honesty goal and attenuate the dissonant effect in high choice participants.  Low 
choice/ honesty prime participants (M = 2.00) were more in favor of comprehensive 
exams than low choice/neutral prime participants (M = 1.33).  This is also consistent 
with my predictions.  The activation of the honesty goal in the low choice condition 
should be capable of producing the dissonance effect even with the absence of choice.  
The pattern of means is summarized in Table 1.
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Accessibility
An examination of accessibility data also revealed trends consistent with my
predictions.  The accessibility measure was constructed by subtracting the number of 
stems that participants completed with compliance related words from the number 
completed with honesty related words (accessibility = honesty - compliance).  Hence, 
scores greater than zero indicate that a greater number of stems were completed with 
honesty related words, while scores less than zero are indicative of a greater number 
of stems completed with compliance related words.  Accessibility was investigated 
using a 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: compliance vs. neutral vs. honesty) 
factorial ANOVA.  Although the 2-way interaction was not significant F (2, 48) =
.95, ns, the means, as shown in Table 2, were in the predicted direction.  High 
choice/neutral prime participants completed more word stems (M = .78) with honesty 
related words than low choice/neutral prime participants (M = -.22).  The honesty 
prime increased the relative accessibility of the honesty goal in the low choice 
condition (M = 1.67), while the compliance prime decreased the relative accessibility 
of the honesty goal in the high choice condition (M = -1.56).  A significant main 
effect of prime, F (2, 48) = 18.91, p <.001, was obtained, such that participants 
primed with honesty completed more word stems with honesty related words (M = 
2.50) than participants receiving the neutral prime (M = .28) or the compliance prime 
(M = -1.50).
Discussion
While there were trends in the data consistent with my hypotheses, there were 
not significant effects. As this study was intended as only a preliminary investigation 
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it was not carried through to its conclusion.  Thus, it’s reasonable to assume that the 
lack of statistical significance may be in part attributable to the low of number of 
participants in the study which would have limited the statistical power of the study.
A criticism of this study raised in the proposal meeting was that the pattern of 
findings for the accessibility data could have been due to semantic priming as 
opposed to differing goal activation effects.  This was indeed a very sound criticism 
when one considers that the set of words participants received in the stem-completion 
task was identical to the words they had been previously presented as primes.  
Consequently, a second study was conducted in which the experimental procedure 
was slightly modified in an attempt to address this issue.  In order to reduce the 
likelihood of participants being semantically primed, I used half of the target words 
from the previously described study as primes while using the other half of the target 
words as stimuli in the stem completion task.  As a result the words presented as 
primes would be different than the words received in the stem-completion task.
Another modification of the study was that I was able to obtain a pretest 
measure of participants’ attitudes toward comprehensive exams.  The purpose of the 
pretest measure was two-fold.  First, it allowed me to include only participants in the 
study who reported a negative attitude toward comprehensive exams.  This afforded 
me the opportunity to ensure that all participants in the study were actually generating 
counter-attitudinal arguments when asked to list arguments in favor of comprehensive 
exams.  This improved upon the preliminary study in which I relied on an untested 
assumption that undergraduate students would prefer not to take comprehensive 
exams as a graduation requirement.  The second benefit was that I was allowed to use 
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the pretest measure as a covariate to further reduce error variability in the dependent 
measure.  The collection of the pretest measure did not affect the experimental 
procedure as this data was collected during a separate mass testing session conducted 
at the beginning of the semester.  There were no additional changes in procedure. 
Chapter 4: Study 1 Method
Participants and Design
Participants in the study were 83 (55 female and 28 male) undergraduate 
students at the University of Maryland in College Park.3 Students took part in the 
experiment to earn extra credit for a course in Introductory Psychology. Participants 
were pre-selected based on responses to an earlier questionnaire in which we 
measured attitudes towards the implementation of comprehensive exams.  
Participants reported on a 7 point scale in which response options ranged from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  Only students who responded between 1 
(strongly disagree) and 3 (slightly disagree) were allowed to participate in the study.
Procedure
With the exception of the previously described adjustments to the priming 
manipulation and the stem completion task, the procedure for this study was identical 
to the procedure of the previous study.
3 Eight-five participants were originally run.  However, two of these were deleted from the analysis 
because they did not check both boxes in the agreement form that manipulated low versus high choice.
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Chapter 5: Study 1 Results
Outcome Measures
Attitude Measure
Participants’ attitude towards the implementation of comprehensive exams 
was the primary dependent measure in this experiment.  In conducting this analysis, 
participants’ pre-experimental attitude toward the implementation of comprehensive 
exams was statistically controlled for using an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA).  
This analysis was conducted using a 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: compliance 
vs. neutral vs. honesty) ANCOVA.  The 2-way interaction of choice and prime was 
significant F (2, 76) = 3.12, p < .05.  The data revealed that high choice/neutral prime 
participants (M = 2.95) had a more favorable attitude towards comprehensive exams 
than low choice/neutral prime participants (M = 1.35).  This pattern replicates the 
typical dissonance finding.  High choice/neutral prime participants (M = 2.95) were 
also more in favor of comprehensive exams than high choice/compliance prime 
participants (M = 1.66). This is consistent with my prediction that activation of the 
compliance goal should inhibit the honesty goal and attenuate the dissonant effect.  
Low choice/honesty prime participants (M = 1.58) were more in favor of 
comprehensive exams than low choice/neutral prime participants (M = 1.35).  This is 
also consistent with my prediction that the activation of the honesty goal in the low 
choice condition should be capable of enhancing the dissonance effect.  There was a 
significant main effect of choice, F (1, 76) = 17.06, p < .001 such that high choice 
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participants (M = 2.52) were more in favor of comprehensive exams than low choice 
participants (M = 1.47).  There was also a marginally significant effect of prime, F (2, 
76) = 4.12, p < .07.  Participants primed with the compliance goal were less in favor 
of comprehensive exams (M = 1.58) than participants primed with either the honesty 
goal (M = 2.26) or participants receiving the neutral prime (M = 2.15). This pattern of 
results can be seen in Table 3. 
Accessibility
Although the attitude measure provided support for the goal systemic analysis, 
the examination of the accessibility data did not provide further support.  The stem-
completion task did not detect differences in the relative accessibility of the honesty 
goal versus the compliance goal.  As in the preliminary study, this measure was 
constructed by subtracting the number of stems completed with compliance related 
words from the number of stems completed with honesty related words (accessibility 
= honesty - compliance).  A 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: compliance vs. 
neutral vs. honesty) factorial ANOVA did not yield significant results F (2, 75) = .36, 
ns.  See Table 4 for summary.
An examination of the accessibility of the honesty goal, alone, did not reveal 
patterns of findings consistent with the predictions.  The accessibility of the honesty 
goal was investigated using a 2 (choice: low vs. high) x 3 (prime: compliance vs. 
neutral vs. honesty) ANOVA.  The 2-way interaction was not significant F (2, 75) 
=.50, ns.  There was, however, a significant main effect of prime F (2, 75) = 2.97, p < 
.05.  Participants given the honesty primed (M = 2.37) completed significantly more 
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stems with honesty-related words than participants in the neutral prime condition (M
= 1.67). 
Discussion
An experiment conducted using the “induced compliance” paradigm provided 
partial support for the goal-systemic analysis of cognitive dissonance phenomena.  
The experiment was conducted to put to an empirical test the hypothesis that 
activation of an honesty goal would increase dissonance effects, while activation of a 
competing goal (i.e. compliance) would attenuate dissonance effects.  The typical 
dissonance effect was indeed reversed in this study through the employment of 
priming procedures.  Low choice participants showed increased dissonance induced 
attitude change when primed with the honesty goal, while high choice participants 
showed decreased dissonance induced attitude change when primed with the 
compliance goal.  Unfortunately, I did not find direct evidence that these outcomes 
were mediated by active commitment to the goal of honesty relative to the goal of 
compliance.  It is possible that the stem completion task employed was not sensitive 
enough to detect differences in the accessibility of the goals assumed to be relevant.  
Nonetheless, this study was effective in shedding some light on the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying dissonance phenomena through examination of the critical 
role of goal activation patterns. 
This study, however, did not address the content – free notion of the goal –
systemic analysis.  It could be argued from a self-a ffirmation perspective (Steele, 
1988), for example, that the honesty prime in this study reduced self-worth for 
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participants (by reminding them of their dishonesty), while the compliance prime 
reduced dissonance, or restored self-worth, by reminding participants that they had 
been compliant or helpful. The very nature of the induced-compliance paradigm 
makes it difficult to remove implications for the self-concept, as the defining feature 
of the paradigm involves an inducement to engage in some action counter to one’s 
beliefs or attitudes.  It’s a reasonable assumption that engaging in such an activity 
will lead one to feel dishonest or hypocritical.  For this reason the content – free 
aspect of the goal - systemic analysis could be better investigated through the use of a 
paradigm in which self-concept related goals aren’t an essential feature of the 
paradigm, itself.  One such paradigm could be the previously described free-choice 
paradigm.  In a second study I attempted to explore dissonance effects in a situation 
in which implications for the self-concept or self-worth could be minimized. 
The goal-systemic analysis of dissonance phenomena does not assign a special 
status to self-concept (or self-esteem) related goals, and is assumed to apply to all 
goals regardless of contents. Accordingly, the exercise of free choice that heretofore 
has been viewed as a necessary condition for the arousal of dissonance (cf. Linder, 
Cooper, and Jones, 1967) is presently viewed as necessary for the experience of 
dissonance only as concerns various self-concept related goals. The exercise of free 
choice is viewed as irrelevant to dissonance aroused by a frustration of non self -
related goals.  
It may be useful, however, to provide a brief sketch of how choice and the 
self-concept have generally come to be accepted as necessary for dissonance arousal.  
Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) boring task study had a profound effect on the field 
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of social psychology due not only to the counterintuitive empirical findings, but also 
due to its inventive methodology.  While there was great interest in dissonance theory 
in general, there was also a great focus on understanding the findings of that 
particular study.  Consequently, many of the now classic studies in dissonance 
research can be directly traced to addressing different theoretical accounts and 
alternative explanations of Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) findings.  One such 
example is the study conducted by Linder et al. (1967) often cited as evidence of the 
necessity of choice. Linder et al. (1967) demonstrated that low incentive leads to 
attitude change only when an individual remains free to decide against compliance, or 
free to choose.  However, tracing the lineage of this study provides a useful 
illustration of how content-related elements commonly associated with a particular 
paradigm (i.e. the induced-compliance paradigm) were assumed critical for the 
occurrence of dissonance effects in general.
After Cohen (1962) replicated the findings of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
in a study in which Yale students were induced to write (counterattitudinal) essays in 
favor of the New Haven police, Rosenberg (1965) proposed an alternative 
explanation for the findings of those experiments.  He suggested that high incentive 
participants, for whom the rewards may have seemed excessive, interpreted the 
experiment as a test of their integrity.  Therefore, participants in the high incentive 
condition might have assumed that they would be viewed more favorably by the 
experimenter if they resisted influence in the face of a bribe to report a positive 
attitude.  When Rosenberg (1965) removed evaluation concerns a reinforcement 
effect was found, and attitude change was positively related to incentive.  
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In an attempt to reconcile the discrepant findings within the induced-
compliance literature, Linder et al. (1967) argued that the effects of incentive would 
depend upon the presence or absence of the freedom to comply with the 
experimenter’s request.  They argued that the Rosenberg (1965) procedure made it 
difficult for participants to refuse to comply, and that this lead to a reinforcement 
effect.  Linder et al. (1967) manipulated choice and found that if participants felt free 
not to comply a dissonance effect was found, but that there was a reinforcement effect 
when freedom was reduced.  This study was important in establishing the importance 
of choice for dissonance arousal.  It is very important, however, to recall that Linder 
et al. (1967) specifically intended to resolve discrepant findings within the induced 
compliance literature.  However, the implications regarding the importance of choice 
were subsequently generalized to dissonance theory in general.
Similarly, those supporting a self-concept interpretation of dissonance often 
focused heavily upon studies conducted in the induced compliance paradigm in 
drawing this conclusion (Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Aronson, 1992; Steele and Lui, 
1983).  Each of the three revisions reviewed in this dissertation (Cooper and Fazio, 
1984; Aronson, 1992; Steele and Lui, 1983) focused their analysis on findings in the 
induced compliance paradigm, and much of the debate among these theorists has 
focused also on the induced-compliance paradigm.  In considering findings in the 
induced compliance paradigm, alone, the self- concept does indeed appear to play a 
critical role.  Within this particular paradigm participants are often made to feel 
dishonest or immoral, and these feelings have clear relevance for the self-concept.  
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However, proponents of the self-concept revisions don’t make clear in their 
argument the unique qualities of self-concept related concerns which would lead 
those concerns alone to lead to dissonance effects.  For example, Aronson’s self-
concept revision is in agreement with Festinger’s (1957) original statement regarding 
the importance of inconsistency for the occurrence of dissonance.  However, when 
suggesting that dissonance “depends on the specific cognitive elements that constitute 
the individual’s self-concept (Thibodeau & Aronson, p.591, 1992)”, it is not clearly 
articulated theoretically why this should be the case.  More specifically, it’s not made 
clear in terms of Festinger’s (1957) original theoretical proposition.  In terms of 
Festinger’s (1957) original statement, dissonance is a function of the ratio of 
dissonant cognitions to total cognitions weighted by importance.  Therefore, one is 
lead to ask if it is an assumption of the self-concept revisionists that self-concept 
related cognitions are distinguished as uniquely important among all other cognitions, 
and consequently, uniquely capable of arousing dissonance effects?   
To briefly summarize, theoretical debates regarding dissonance effects were 
often conducted within the perhaps narrow confines of the induced-compliance 
paradigm.  This focus on the induced-compliance paradigm has had implications for 
assumptions about the necessity of both free choice and the self-concept.  When 
operating within a paradigm defined by inducing participants to make statements or 
engage in behaviors counter to their actual beliefs and attitudes, then one’s self-
concept as an honest person or a person with integrity may be implicated.  Further, 
self-concept and free choice are closely linked.  When self-concept concerns arise the 
issue of free choice has special relevance for reasons that have been articulated by 
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researchers who posit the necessity of choice (i.e. personal responsibility).   Also, 
when one makes a choice the self-concept may be implicated as this is relevant to our 
(self-concept related) goal of being good decision makers.  However, the goal 
systemic analysis does not make the assumption that dissonance phenomena only 
occur when choices are made (and consequently the self-concept is implicated); or 
that the implication of the self-concept is a precondition (which may increase the 
relevance of whether or not one perceives the presence of choice).  This aspect of the 
goal-systemic analysis was explored in Study 2. 
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Chapter 6: Study 2 Method
Goal-Systemic Effects in “Free Choice” Paradigm
The second experiment also involved a goal-priming and a free-choice 
manipulation. This time, however, these were varied in a free-choice paradigm rather 
than in the induced compliance paradigm.  The main purpose of this study was to 
investigate the idea that the presence of a free choice constitutes a necessary 
condition for dissonance effects only where maintenance of a positive self-concept 
represents an individual’s important goal to which he or she is actively committed. 
Discrepancy from an actively committed goal that does not involve the self-concept 
will give rise to dissonance reduction phenomena irrespective of the presence or 
absence of free choice. In this sense, the present study investigated the content-free 
aspect of the goal-systemic analysis consistent with Festinger’s (1957) original 
formulation but differing from the subsequent revisions of dissonance theory 
(Aronson, 1992; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Steele, 1988). 
A major finding in the free-choice paradigm was the “spreading apart” effect 
of the choice alternatives following a freely undertaken decision between alternatives 
assumed to induce the state of cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956).  The present 
research assumes that the dissonance-induced “spreading of alternatives” will occur
in the absence of choice to increase the sense that the individual’s received outcome 
is congruent with this person’s active and important goal.  In this experiment, a goal 
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representation was introduced that was unrelated to one’s self-concept (i.e. one’s
goals of appearing moral or competent).  An individual then received an outcome for 
which certain aspects, i.e., the negative aspects of the chosen alternative and the 
positive aspects of the rejected alternative, could be viewed as incongruent with that 
goal. Under these conditions I expected a cognitive change to take place that would 
minimize the accessibility of these incongruent aspects and reduce their weight in 
determining the individual’s overall satisfaction with the outcome. Ultimately then, I 
expected that a re-evaluation of the alternatives would take place such that the 
alternative that the participant received would be evaluated more positively, and the 
alternative that she or he did not receive would be evaluated more negatively than 
was the case before this particular outcome took place.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants in this study were 78 female University of Maryland 
undergraduates who took part in the study to earn extra credit in one of their 
psychology courses4. The design was a 2 (Choice: choice vs. no choice) x 3 (Prime: 
decision-making vs. fitness vs. no-prime) factorial ANOVA.  Participants were 
primed with either the goal of good decision making, with the goal of fitness, or with 
a neutral prime.  Next, participants were presented with 10 fitness classes and asked 
to rate their desirability.  They also ranked the activities according to their personal 
preference.  They were then either given a choice between their 3rd - and 4th - ranked 
4
 Eighty participants were originally run, but two were excluded for reporting suspicions during the 
debriefing.
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activity or, they were given their 3rd- ranked activity as a bonus gift.  Finally, 
participants re-rated the desirability of all the 10 fitness classes. 
I assumed that as compared to the neutral prime condition, priming the 
decision making goal would increase the effect of choice on (1) the spreading apart of 
the two alternatives in terms of their desirability such that under choice (versus no 
choice) the chosen alternative would be rated as more desirable as compared to the 
original rating and the rejected alternative as less desirable as compared to the 
original rating. 
I assumed further that as compared to the neutral prime condition the fitness 
prime would eliminate the effect of choice (2) on the re-rating of the two alternatives 
such that irrespective of choice there would be a spreading apart effect with the 
received alternative being rated as more desirable and the non-received alternative as 
less desirable compared to the original rating.
Procedure  
The procedure was similar to that used in earlier free choice experiments (e.g. 
Brehm, 1956; Steele, et al. 1993).  Participants participated in this study ostensibly as 
part of market research examining fitness preferences. 
Priming manipulation 
Participants responded to a general background questionnaire ostensibly in 
order to allow the experimenter to determine their “life style” profile. The goal 
priming manipulation was embedded in this questionnaire. In the decision making 
goal condition, participants were asked to list three reasons why decision making 
skills were important in life. In the fitness condition, they were asked to list three 
42
reasons why fitness was important in life. In the neutral control condition, they 
described three animals that they like the most.
Evaluating the to be chosen or to be received alternatives 
At this point, participants were given a brochure describing with 10 different 
fitness activities.  They were asked to (1) rate, on an unnumbered 12-point scale, each 
in terms of its desirability, and (2) rank order them in order of their personal 
preferences.
Manipulating the choice variable  
Participants in the choice condition were presented with a coupon to attend 
their 3rd- and 4th- ranked alternatives and asked to choose one as a token of 
appreciation for their participation in the study. In the no choice condition, 
participants were given their 3rd- ranked alternative ostensibly as a token of 
appreciation for their participation in the study. 
The re-rating task 
Participants were presented again with all 10 activities and asked once again 
to rate their perceived desirability.  The re-rating task was identical to the task in 
which participants made their initial ratings.  This concluded the experiment. 
Participants were thoroughly debriefed, and their questions, if any were fully 
answered. 
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Chapter 7: Study 2 Results
Outcome Measures
Spreading of Alternatives
The primary dependent measure in studies employing the free choice 
paradigm is the spreading of alternatives, computed by subtracting the change in the 
rating of the not received alternative from the change in the rating of the received 
alternative (spreading =  received -  rejected).  There was a significant two-way 
interaction in the spreading of alternatives, F (2, 75) = 3.88, p < .05.  High 
choice/neutral prime participants (M = .67) showed significantly more spreading than 
no choice/neutral prime participants (M = -1.00).  This replicated the classic 
dissonance effect.  Consistent with my predictions, no choice/fitness prime 
participants (M = .38) showed more spreading than no choice/neutral prime (M = -
1.00) and no choice/ decision prime participants ( M = -1. 07).  Also, high 
choice/decision prime participants (M = .77) showed significantly more spreading 
than no choice/decision making prime participants (M = -1.07).  Overall, high 
choice/decision prime participants showed the most substantial spreading, which is 
consistent with my analysis.  These results are presented in Table 5.
Although this pattern of data provides some support for my hypothesis, some 
aspects of the data merit closer attention.  Although the pattern of means obtained in 
examining the spreading of alternatives was in the predicted direction, little evidence 
was found that participants downgraded the not received alternative.  For this reason I 
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undertook separate analyses examining re-ratings of the received and not received 
alternatives, apart from the spread of alternatives.
Received Alternative  
There was a significant two-way interaction in the re-rating of the received 
alternative, F (2, 75) = 3.67, p < .05.  No choice/fitness prime participants upgraded 
the received alternative (M = .77) more than no choice/decision prime participants (M 
= - .85).  No choice/fitness prime participants (M = .77) also upgraded significantly 
more than no choice/neutral prime participants (M = -.75).  Both of these outcomes 
are consistent with my predictions that activation of the fitness goal should lead to a 
more positive evaluation of the received alternative even in the absence of choice.  
However, in the high choice/fitness prime condition liking decreases (M = -.17), 
though not significantly.
Participants who received the decision prime and no choice actually 
downgraded the received activity (M = -.85).  In fact, there is significant spreading in 
the direction of the not received alternative, t (13) = -2.16, p < .05.  Although I would 
not have predicted this result, it may be a plausible assumption that these participants, 
primed with the decision making goal, reacted negatively to not having the freedom 
to actually make a decision.  This finding is consistent with the idea in past 
dissonance research that participants are concerned with being good decision makers.  
Participants in the high choice/decision making prime condition showed the most 
substantial upgrading of the received alternative (M = 1.00).  These participants 
significantly upgraded the received fitness activity, t (13) = 2.08, p < .05, which is 
consistent with my analysis.  These results are presented in Table 6.
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Not Received Alternative
Surprisingly, there was a tendency to increase the rating of the not received 
activity for all groups except the high choice/neutral prime participants (see Table 7).
None of the groups, however, showed statistically significant increases.  
Discussion
This study attempted to test the content-free notion of the goal systemic 
analysis of cognitive dissonance theory.  The implication for contents is that an 
increase in liking can occur without choice, but only if choosing itself is not a goal.  If 
receiving a fitness activity is itself a goal then motivational bias (of the kind 
dissonance theory discussed) can occur without a choice.  For the most part, however, 
the action is on the received and not the not-received alternative.  Perhaps 
participants’ focus on the received alternative inhibits the not-received alternative 
(Shah, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2002).  This may hold especially true in the no choice 
condition.  Although these participants were presented with two alternatives before 
being given one, there may not have been sufficient motivation to weigh the merits of 
each.  For this reason we may not have sufficiently captured those situations in which 
individuals have knowledge of a range of possible outcomes, and thoroughly consider 
those outcomes, even though they lack control over the outcome that ultimately 
occurs.  Nevertheless, this study provided partial support for my hypothesis.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
The purpose of this dissertation was to carry out a goal systemic analysis of 
cognitive dissonance theory in an attempt to examine the molecular elements involved in 
dissonance arousal.  I attempted to elaborate on Festinger’s (1957) original formulation 
by taking a fine-grained approach in order to examine the precise nature of the cognitive
elements which lead to dissonance arousal, as well as the critical inconsistency.  I 
proposed that the relevant cognitive elements were those with motivational contents, or 
from a goal systems perspective, goal representations.  Further, the critical inconsistency 
is that which exist between a goal representation and any information that conveys 
frustration of the goal.  This perspective suggests that dissonance will be experienced 
when an actively committed goal is confronted with the real or expected possibility of its 
frustration. Accordingly, the degree to which the goal in question is subjectively 
important to the individual as well as the degree to which it is cognitively active at a 
particular moment (jointly defining the concept of active commitment) should determine 
the degree of cognitive dissonance. Viewed in these terms, the magnitude of dissonance 
should be affected not only by characteristics of a given focal goal but also by 
characteristics of other, currently active, goals that may determine the amount of 
resources and activation accorded to the focal goal.  
Some support was found for these hypotheses.  I was able to reverse typical 
dissonance effects found in the induced-compliance paradigm through the employment of 
priming procedures.  Participants who wrote counterattitudinal arguments under low 
choice showed increased dissonance induced attitude change when primed with an 
honesty goal (versus a neutral prime), while participants who wrote the arguments under 
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high choice showed less dissonance induced attitude change when primed with a 
compliance goal (versus a neutral prime).  In other words, the tendency for there to be 
less attitude change under low choice was reversed by priming the honesty goal, and the 
tendency to exhibit more attitude change under high choice was reversed by priming a 
compliance goal. Presumably, the goal of honestly expressing one’s views was more 
active for those participants primed with the honesty goal, even when given low choice, 
leading to more dissonance induced attitude change.  On the other hand, the honesty goal 
was at least momentarily inhibited for participants who received the compliance prime.  
As a result these participants showed less dissonance induced attitude change. 
Although these results were suggestive, I failed to find more direct support for the 
proposed mediation of dissonance effects through an attempt to measure the accessibility 
of the goals that were assumed to be relevant.  Perhaps the employment of a more 
sensitive measure, such as a lexical decision task, would more effectively detect differing 
goal activation effects if they indeed exist.  Given the encouraging results found 
regarding the attitude measure, this would seem to an avenue worth pursuing in future 
research.
An important implication of the goal-systemic analysis also tested was that 
dissonance arousal and the resulting efforts to reduce dissonance should be manifest 
irrespective of differing goal contents, and not limited solely to contents related to the 
self-concept.  Some support was found through an experiment employing the free choice 
paradigm.  Using the free choice paradigm I attempted to mitigate implications for 
participants’ self-concept by priming participants with a fitness goal or, in this context, of 
getting the best fitness activity.  Participants with a fitness goal who received no choice 
48
showed more spreading than participants who had a goal of being good decision makers 
or those given a neutral prime.  That provides some support for the contention that 
dissonance effects can be elicited in the absence of choice, when self-concept concerns 
are less relevant.  Also, participants primed with a goal of being good decision makers 
showed the most substantial spreading when they were actually able to make a decision. 
This is also consistent with my analysis.
Future Directions 
Another important implication of a goal-systemic analysis relates to the affective 
response to dissonance arousal.  In previous versions of dissonance theory a major 
consequence of cognitive dissonance is a state of aversive physiological arousal 
(Festinger, 1957, Zanna & Cooper, 1974). Such a state presumably is qualitatively similar 
across different dissonance situations and does not vary as function of the contents of the 
specific cognitions assumed to be dissonant with one another. By contrast, in the present 
analysis the nature of the experience in different dissonant situation may vary 
qualitatively depending on the nature of the goal being frustrated. Relevant in this context 
is Higgins (e.g., 1997) distinction between promotion and prevention goals. A prevention 
goal represents an objective of fulfilling one’s felt duty or obligation. Its frustration is 
known to lead to feelings of agitation and anxiety. By contrast, a promotion goal is 
related to the fulfillment of one’s ideals, and its frustration is known to lead to feeling of 
sadness and dejection. If the goal-systemic analysis is correct, a “dissonant state” arising 
from the frustration of a prevention goal is likely to be experienced in a very different 
way from a “dissonant state” arising from the frustration of a promotion goal. 
Furthermore, note that in Higgins’ (1997) theory frustration of a prevention goal is 
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reducible exclusively through alteration of the specific frustrating cognition, because the 
security needs underlying prevention concerns allow no “crack” in one’s “armor” to 
exist. By contrast, frustration of promotion goals is assumed to be more flexible and to be 
realizable via a variety of substitutable avenues (Higgins, 1997). In other words, 
according to the present analysis the modes of dissonance reduction may differ 
considerably depending on the type of goal which frustration created the state of 
dissonance to begin with. Such implications of the goal-systemic analysis of dissonance 
phenomena could be fruitfully pursued in further research. 
Beyond the theoretical implications articulated in this dissertation, the goal-
systemic approach also has practical implications.  An important area in which there may 
be implications has to do with behavioral interventions of the sort implemented in the 
area of public health.  For example, in research on effective HIV/AIDS preventions, two 
of the factors that are considered important are that targets of the intervention receive 
clear strategies for how to practice safer sex, and also, that the intervention is conducted 
in several sessions over a period of weeks (Darbes, Kennedy, Peersman, Zohrabyan, & 
Rutherford, 2002).  In terms of the goal-systemic analysis one interpretation of this might 
be that the provision of clearly communicated strategies increases the perceived 
attainability of the goal of following safer practices, thereby increasing the subjective 
utility of the goal (Kruglanski et al, 2002).  Further, the goal may become more 
accessible, or active commitment may be increased, by the fact that the intervention takes 
place in multiple sessions over a period of time (Higgins, 2000).  
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Table 1
Means for Attitude towards Exams as a Function of Choice and Prime in 
Preliminary Experiment
Prime
Choice Compliance     Neutral     Honesty
Low 1.22 1.33 2.00
High 1.44 2.78 3.00




Means for Relative Accessibility of Honesty Goal as a Function of Choice 
and Prime in Preliminary Experiment
Prime
Choice Compliance     Neutral     Honesty
Low -1.44 -.22 1.67
High -1.56 .78 3.33
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher relative accessibility of the honesty 
goal (compared to compliance goal).
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Table 3
Adjusted Means for Attitude towards Exams as a Function of Choice and 
Prime in Experiment 1
Prime
Choice Compliance     Neutral     Honesty
Low 1.50a 1.35a 1.58a
High 1.66a 2.95b 2.94b
Note. Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitude towards 
comprehensive exams. (Means with different subscripts differ at p < .05, 
Least Significant Difference test.)
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Table 4
Means for Relative Accessibility of Honesty Goal as a Function of Choice 
and Prime in Experiment 1
Prime
Choice Compliance     Neutral     Honesty
Low .93 .14 1.00
High .85 .38 .54
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher relative accessibility of the honesty 
goal (compared to compliance goal).
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Table 5
Spread of Alternatives as a Function of Choice and Prime in Experiment 2
Prime
Choice Fitness Neutral     Decision
Absent  .31ab -1.00a -1.07a
Present -.58ab   .67b   .77b




Changing in Ratings for Received Activity as a Function of Choice and 
Prime in Experiment 2
Prime
Choice Fitness Neutral     Decision
Absent  .77a -.75b -.85b
Present -.17ab -.08ab 1.00a




Changing in Ratings for Not Received Activity as a Function of Choice and 
Prime in Experiment 2
Prime
Choice Fitness Neutral     Decision
Absent .46  .25 .23
Present .42 -.75 .23
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Appendix A
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please complete each of the following word stems with the first 
word that comes to mind.   For example, the word stem “app____” could be 
completed by forming “apple, appendix, application, etc.”
upr___________________  spi___________________ vio___________________ 
ass___________________  sil___________________  anc___________________ 
sto___________________  por___________________  agr___________________ 
swi___________________ fol___________________ tab___________________ 
cig___________________  wil___________________  thu___________________ 
con___________________ tig___________________ san___________________ 
umb___________________ bro___________________  dut___________________ 
att___________________ tor___________________  whi___________________ 
pum___________________ tem___________________  lav___________________ 
win___________________  zeb___________________ chu___________________ 
sno___________________  pit___________________   tra___________________ 
esc___________________   hon__________________ mar___________________ 
pli___________________ cro___________________     bla___________________ 
tru___________________  but___________________ int___________________ 
hou___________________  rab___________________ pen___________________ 
rev___________________ rul___________________  sai___________________ 
rel___________________ sym___________________ tom___________________ 
bot___________________  scr___________________ ban___________________ 
bro___________________  pre___________________  xyl___________________ 
vir___________________ shi___________________ arr___________________ 
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